School of Business and Management Department of Finance 180 Institutional Investors and Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Preferences Supervisor: YEGEN Eyueb Enes / FINA Student: CHAN Wing Sum / ECOF CHEN Hongxing/ DA KHAN Zeeshan Alam / DSCT LEE Ka Lok / FINA LIU Xiyue / QFIN SO Eric Yik Huen / FINA YAN Aaron Pui Ho / ECOF YIP King Sing / SBM YU Wanting / RMBI ZHAO Yuqin / MAEC Course: UROP 1000, Summer UROP 1000, Summer UROP 1000, Summer UROP 1100, Summer UROP 1000, Summer UROP 4100, Summer UROP 1100, Summer UROP 1000, Summer UROP 1100, Summer UROP 1000, Summer The concept of circular economy is gaining awareness among investors with the aim to promote a closed loop consumption pattern to lessen environmental impacts. The manufacturing sector, known for its rapid linear consumption and waste generation, is under increasing pressure to adopt CE practices to satisfy the needs for ESG investors. To conduct the project, we analysed 9 selected papers to understand the role of internal governance mechanisms in promoting CE practices and their impact on institutional investors preference under an analysis of ESG and Non-ESG Oriented investors. Further helped with the data matching task with the data pool from the US Periodic Transaction Report. Products, Supply Chains, and Finance Supervisor: ZALDOKAS Alminas / FINA Student: LIU Jia Da / RMBI LUO Yulan / ECOF Course: UROP 1100, Fall UROP 2100, Fall This report examines the relationship between executive compensation and product market collusion, particularly in the context of reduced antitrust enforcement. Using the 2013 closure of regional offices of the U.S. Department of Justice as a case study, the study investigates whether firms adjusted executive pay structures to incentivize managers to engage in collusive behavior. The findings reveal that affected firms increased the sensitivity of CEO pay to the performance of their local rivals and granted longer vesting periods, indicating a reward for collusive behavior and providing long-term incentives for collusion. The research highlights the significance of corporate governance and managerial compensation in motivating collusion when antitrust enforcement is weakened. Additionally, the report explores other research on changes in product-level sales after environmental or social incidents and analyzes a dataset of US firms. These investigations contribute to a better understanding of the complexities surrounding product market interactions and their broader economic implications.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NDk5Njg=